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THE HIGH COST OF BORROWING-LATE FEES,
ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE, AND GARRETT
v. COAST AND SOUTHERN FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
INTRODUCTION

In February, 1971, one California savings and loan association held approximately thirty-two thousand loan contracts secured by real property interests of obligors. Each contract contained a provision similar to the following:
The undersigned further agrees that in the event that
payments of either principal or interest on this note becomes
in default, the holder may, without notice, charge additional

interest at the rate of two (2%) -per cent per annum on the
unpaid principle balance of this note from the date unpaid
interest started to accrue until the close of the business day
upon which payment curing the default is received.'
As a result of this clause the lender had, during the preceding
four-year period, collected late-payment charges totaling $1,900,000 from some 5,000 of its 32,000 obligors.
Until the landmark decision by the California Supreme Court
in Garrett v. Coast and Southern Federal Savings and Loan As-

sociation,' such late payment provisions were judicially permissible in California despite the courts' otherwise harsh attitude
toward contractual liquidated damages, contractual penalties, and
unlawful interest rates. This anomalous situation evolved from
the application of the contracts concept of alternative performance and originated in California with two nineteenth-century
cases' and their progeny. In applying this concept of alternative
performance to a loan situation, the courts permitted loan agreements to require an additional interest charge based on the entire
principal whenever the obligor made a late payment. The courts
theorized that this scheme provided an "alternative option" to
making payments when due. The borrower may exercise -his
"option" merely by paying a substantially greater amount sometime after the original installment was due. By considering these
payments within the framework of alternative performance, they
1. Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 735, 511
P.2d 1197, 1199, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845, 847 (1973).
2. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
3. Finger v. McCaughey, 114 Cal. 64, 45 P. 1004 (1896); Thompson v.
Gorner, 104 Cal. 168, 37 P. 900 (1894).
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were subject neither to statutory requirements for liquidated damages nor to the proscription of contractual penalties.
An examination of this peculiar application of the alternative performance doctrine in the late-payment charge context will
provide a background for discussion of the Garrett decision.
Prior to this examination, however, a brief review of contractual
liquidated damages provisions, with special emphasis on the California approach, is necessary in order to understand the cases
which preceded Garrett, as well as the decisions and statutory revisions likely to follow in its wake. A proposal currently before
the California Legislature that would drastically revise statutory
control over liquidated damages and late charges in loan contracts
will then -be investigated.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN CONTRACTS

Within broadly defined limits parties are normally able to
establish contractual relationships. This power given by the
state to parties to make their own rules and determine the allocation of risk between themselves is commonly referred to as the
"freedom of contract". 4 During the bargaining process the parties establish their mutual primary rights and obligations (that
is, performance expected and owed). Additionally, the parties
sometimes make provisions for remedial rights in the event that
one of the parties fails to meet its primary obligations. Remedial
rights include provisions for specific performance, payment of
a penalty, and payment of liquidated damages. The courts, however, appear to take a considerably narrower view on the ability
of contracting parties to establish remedial rights. For example,
courts will often give no effect to contractual clauses providing
for specific performance5 or a penalty in the event of breach.
Contracting parties may, however, determine in advance
what amount of damages will be assessed should a 'breach occur.
Distinguishing valid predetermined or liquidated damages from
invalid contractual penalties is frequently a difficult task for the
4. Professor Justin Sweet prefers the term "party autonomy" to "freedom
of contract" since he considers the latter term only an expression of the power
parties possess to make contracts. Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60
CALIF. I- REv. 84 n.1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sweet].
5. For a collection of cases involving judicial assessment of contractual
clauses mandating specific performance in the event of breach, see MacNeil,
Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 521-22 (1962).
6. Better Foods Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253
P.2d 10 (1953). One traditional use of the term "penalty" in the contract setting
is to designate a charge that cannot qualify as a proper liquidated damage. Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 9 Cal. 3d 731, 73,6 n.4, 511 P.2d 1197,
1200 n.4, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 n.4 (1973).
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courts. In deciding whether or not to permit parties to liquidate
contractual damages by agreement, the court may ask whether
the injury likely to result from the breach was difficult or impossible to accurately estimate,7 whether the parties intended to provide for damages rather than merely to penalize for failure to
perform,8 and, finally, whether the sum stipulated by the parties
was a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.9 The last
condition is often most crucial to judicial evaluation of the validity of a liquidated damages provision. 10
Valid liquidated damages provisions serve several useful purposes. Corbin views such provisions as resulting in fewer
breaches and fewer lawsuits, with concomitant effect of fewer
and easier trials."
These provisions also aid the courts in
achieving just results, since judicial determination of damages
often is no better than a guess. 12 Inclusion of liquidated damages provisions permits the parties to the contract to control liability
for their own breaches, which is particularly attractive in highrisk situations as an alternative to relying on the judicial process.' s
Both the breaching and nonbreaching parties may benefit from a
properly designed liquidation provision. It may be possible to
include consideration for legitimate excuses for nonperformance
and unusual damage-measurement problems in the calculation of
the liquidated sum by the parties.' 4
Liquidated Damages in California

Statutory controls over liquidated damages in California are
found in the California Civil Code, sections 1670-1671. Section
1670 provides that liquidation provisions are void unless they
meet the requirements set forth in section 1671.1' Section 1671
states:
The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an
amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when from the nature of
7. Jaquith v. Hudson, 5 Mich. 123 (1858). See also notes 17-30 and accompanying text infra.
8. What the parties intended to achieve with the questioned liquidation
clause may not be significant to the courts. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907); CALAMARI & PERILLO, CONTRACTS 367 (1970).
9. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113,
97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
10. MCCORMCK, DAMAGES §§ 148-49 (1935).
11. 5 CORaIN ON CONTRACTS § 1057 (1964).
12. Sweet, supra note 4, at 88.
13. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION RELATING TO LIQUIDATED DAMAGEs 2-3 (November, 1973).
14. Id.
15. CAL. Clv. CODE § 1670 (West 1970).
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the case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult 'to
fix the actual damage. 1

One of the leading cases in California which interpreted the test of
section 1671 is Better Foods Markets, Inc. v. American District
Telegraph Co.17 In Better Foods, American District Telegraph, a
supplier of burglar alarm systems, entered into an alarm service
contract with the market. The contract contained a $50 liquidation clause, which was to be invoked in the event that a failure
of American's system resulted in a loss to the market. When
American neglected to notify the police promptly that a robbery
was in progress at the market, the felons escaped successfully
with $36,000. The California Supreme Court rejected the market's argument that determination of the "question of the impracticability and difficulty in fixing the damages" should be
made "after the loss has occurred."' The court held that the
proper time for determining impracticability or difficulty in fixing damages was when the contract was made.'" The statutory
tory requirement of impracticability or extreme difficulty in fixing damages has been termed the "difficulty of ascertainment"
test for liquidated damages. 0 As was suggested in Better Foods,
the California courts have adopted what has come to be called a
"look forward" approach in determining when actual damages
must be difficult to ascertain. 2' The approach is predicated on
the court's ability to put itself in the position of the parties when
the contract was made and determine in that context whether the
potential harm from breach would be impracticable or extremely
difficult to ascertain. 22
The statutory language of the "difficulty of ascertainment"
test does -not indicate how much uncertainty is necessary in order to validate liquidated damages provisions in a contract. Supreme court cases tend to concentrate on the reasonableness of
the process by which the parties estimate the compensation to be
paid in the event of breach.23 Professor Sweet found, however,
that there is usually little evidence available of the process by
which the parties determined stipulated amounts in most cases.24
16. Id. § 1671.
17. 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953).
18. Id. at 185, 253 P.2d at 14.
19. Id.
20. Sweet, supra note 4, at 131.
21. Id. at 131-33.
22. Better Foods Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist.
185, 253 P.2d 10, 14 (1953); see also McCarthy v.
P.2d 981 (1956).
23. McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 586, 297
ter Foods Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40
10, 15 (1953).
24. Sweet, supra note 4, at 137.

Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179,
Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297
P.2d 981, 987 (1956); BetCal. 2d 179, 187, 253 P.2d
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Perhaps, the process used by the parties to select liquidation
amounts is not vital to the California courts as long as the
amount selected is reasonable.25
The California courts have refused to enforce liquidated
damages provisions on equitable grounds such as coercion or oppression,2 6 unjust enrichment, 27 and the decision that such
a
28 Of
clause was a penalty assessment rather than compensation.
course, it is impossible to obtain completely equitable results in
every decision; thus, equitable arguments usually have not moved
the courts unless one of the parties would be seriously injured
by enforcement of the liquidated damages provision.29
Another factor that the California courts may consider in making their decision whether to permit enforcement of a liquidation
provision is the amount of actual damage suffered by the beneficiary of the provision. The amount of actual damage may, for
example, aid the court in determining whether the parties made a
reasonable endeavor to estimate damages when they formed the
contract including a liquidation provision."0 But it is not required that the plaintiff affirmatively allege or prove actual damage in order to obtain judicial enforcement of the liquidation provision.8 ' If, however, the defendant can show that the plaintiff
suffered no actual damage as a result of defendant's breach,
the
32
court may refuse to permit enforcement of the provision.
Until quite recently the California courts have paid little attention to the difference between a negotiated contract and a contract of adhesion when determining the enforceability of liquidation provisions. The apparent judicial insensitivity to this important distinction may be due to the lack of cases involving liquidation provisions in the adhesion context and lack of judicial
25. Id. at 138.
26. Mente & Co., Inc. v. Fresno Compress & Whse. Co., 113 Cal. App. 325,
298 P. 126 (1931).
27. Muldoon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 P. 417 (1885).
28. Id. at 539-40, 6 P. at 418-19. According to Professor Sweet, in the context of liquidated damages, "[a] penalty is a clause designed to coerce performance rather than to estimate damages." Sweet, supra note 4, at 92.
29. See, e.g., Mente & Co., Inc. v. Fresno Compress & Whse. Co., 113 Cal.
App. 325, 333, 298 P. 126, 129 (1921), in which the court refused to enforce
contractual liquidated damages which amounted to full performance by the other
party in addition to what the "injured party" had already received under the contract.
30. See Wilmington Transp. Co. v. O'Neill, 98 Cal. 1, 32 P. 705 (1893).
31. McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956).
32. Eva v. McMahon, 77 Cal. 467, 472, 19 P. 872, 874 (1888). According
to Professor Sweet, "when directly faced with the question, most American courts
will not knowingly enforce a liquidated damages clause where there is no actual
damage." Sweet, supra note 4, at 139 (emphasis by the author).

1974]

THE HIGH COST OF BORROWING

awareness of the significance of this distinction in regard to liquidated damages. 8 There was, however, another reason for the
apparent lack of judicial interest in the effect of liquidation provisions in the adhesion context. This reason was judicial acceptance of the use of the contracts' concept of alternative performance to insulate liquidation provisions from the strictures of California statutory controls over contractual. liquidated damages.3 4
THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE

If a builder agrees to construct a house for someone within a
given period of time or pay the other party $4,000, one approach
to the payment provision is to classify it as liquidated damages in
the event that the builder fails to perform within the time limitation. The court may, however, consider the payment provisions
as an alternative performance in consideration of the "privilege"
of finishing late. By this method of interpretation, the agreement becomes an option contract in which the price for the option to terminate is fixed.33 The latter approach provides an obvious 'advantage to the "innocent" party in a jurisdiction where
-liquidated damages provisions are carefully scrutinized by the
courts, particularly if the payment provision could not survive
as a liquidated damage.38 The California courts adopted this
alternative performance approach in evaluating late-charge provisions in loan contracts.3 7 Frequently those provisions were unacceptable when viewed as liquidated damages.3 " Nevertheless,
this alternative performance approach was accepted in California
until 1973, when Garrett v. Coast and Southern Federal Savings

and Loan Association"9 was decided. This novel treatment of
late-charge provisions, which seems to have been unique to California, was derived from four cases,4 0 two of which were decided
before the turn of the century. 4 '
33. Sweet, supra note 4, at 139.
34. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1670-71 (West 1970); see text accompanying notes
15-22 supra.
35. CALAMAu & PEJULLO, CoSTmcrs 369-70 (1970).
36. For example, the defendant could demonstrate that the plaintiff had
suffered no loss as a result of the breach or that the process for determining
the cost of the "option" was unreasonable. See text accompanying notes 23-32
supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 46-80 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 98-102 infra.
39. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
40. Finger v. McCaughey, 114 Cal. 64, 45 P. 1004 (1896); Thompson v.
Gorner, 104 Cal. 168, 37 P. 900 (1894); Walsh v. Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 1 Cal. App. 3d 578, 81 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969); O'Connor v. Richmond
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 Cal. App. 2d 523, 68 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1968).
41. Finger v. McCaughey, 114 Cal. 64, 45 P. 1004 (1896); Thompson v.
Gorner, 104 Cal. 168, 37 P. 900 (1894).
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Thompson v. Gorner:4 2 introduction of alternative
performancedoctrine

In Thompson the borrower gave the lender a mortgage interest in real property to secure a promissory note which included

the following interest provision:
With interest thereon . . . at the rate of eight per cent
per annum . . . and if said principal or interest is not paid
as it becomes due it shall48thereafter bear interest at the rate
of one percent per month.
After the note matured, the borrower continued to pay the lender
interest at the eight percent rate for two additional years without
paying back the principal of the loan. At the end of this period,

the lender notified the borrower that no further interest installments would be accepted unless such installments included the
additional one percent interest.1 The California Supreme Court,
holding for the lender, concluded that the payment of an additional one percent interest, as specified in the note, was not a
contractual penalty for nonperformance, but was instead a spe-

cial contract to pay a different interest rate upon a contingency:

full payment of principal and interest when the
failure to tender
45
note matured.

The reasoning behind the supreme court's decision in
Thompson was questionable. Although the trial court had
found the extra interest charge assessed after maturity of the

note was a penalty, the supreme court was satisfied with its reversal on first hearing based on the doctrine of alternative per-

formance.1 The decision on first hearing combined the4 7broad
definition of "interest" in section 1915 of the Civil Code with
the unlimited freedom allowed contracting parties in selecting interest rates under section 1918 of the Code 48 to reach the conclu-

sion that "parties may agree in writing for such rate of interest as
42. 104 Cal. 168, 37 P. 900 (1894).
43. Id. at 169, 37 P. at 901.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 170, 37 P. at 901. The court, however, viewed the lender's prior
acceptance of payments at the lower rate of interest as a waiver of the late provision during that period, thus making the borrower liable for the higher rate only
after the lender demanded it. This was the second hearing by the supreme court
on Thompson. The first hearing, which was unreported, provided the bulk of
the reasoning upon which the Thompson court relied and is discussed below.
46. Id.
47. CAL. Crw. CODE § 1915 (West 1970), which provides:
Interest is the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties
for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money.
48. Former section 1918 of the Civil Code, which was repealed by an initiative measure in 1918, provided that parties could agree in writing for the payment of any rate of interest which would be allowed, according to the terms of
the agreement, until the entry of judgment. Cal. Stats. (1919), lxxxvii, § 4.
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they choose, not only before the maturity of the contract, but
after its breach, and until paid."'49 The payment of additional interest in this case was "to be enforced as per contract, and not
treated as penalties." 5 0 The conditions which activated this con5
tractual alternative were maturity and nonpayment of the note. '
ochad
breach
actual
In effect then, the argument was that no
curred. In addition to declaring that the supplemental interest
charge of one percent per month after maturity was not a penalty,
the holding on first hearing had, by implication, indicated that the
Civil Code provisions controlling liquidated damages" were not
applicable, since no breach had occurred.
The Thompson approach to supplementary interest provisions was significantly extended by the 53California Supreme Court
two years later in Fingerv. McCaughey.
Finger v. McCaughey:5 4 retroactivelate-payment interest
Finger, like Thompson, involved a note secured by a mortgage. When the note matured, the borrower failed to tender full
payment. The interest provision in the Finger note, however,
differed significantly from the provision in the Thompson note:
With interest from date at the rate of ten per cent per
annum, provided this note is paid at maturity, but if not paid
at maturity, then it shall bear interest at the rate of twelve
per cent per annun from its date until paid, and, if the interest is not paid at the end of one year from date, it shall
become a part of the principal and bear twelve per cent interest per annum. 55
The court, again holding for the lender, found the agreement between the parties for an increased interest rate contingent on nonpayment of either principal or interest when due permissible as
an alternative performance.5 6 In addition, the court permitted
retroactive application of57 the increased interest rate to the date
when the loan was made.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
support
57.

Thompson v. Gorner, 36 P. 434, 435, 4 Cal. Unrep. 606, 608 (1894).
Id. at 435, 4 Cal. Unrep. at 609.
Id.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1670-71 (West 1970).
114 Cal. 64, 45 P. 1004 (1896). - .
Id.
Id. at 65, 45 P. 1004 (emphasis added).
Id. at 66, 45 P. at 1004. The Finger court cited Thompson as the sole
for its decision.
The Finger court also held that interest accruing after maturity of the

note could not be compounded because of strict statutory requirements as to specificity in any loan agreement looking to compound interest. Id. The Finger
court cited as support section 1919 of the Civil Code (which was abolished by
the same initiative measure that abolished section 1918, Cal. Stats. (1919),
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The Finger court dismissed arguments on behalf of the
borrower's estate that the attempt to increase the interest on
breach and to have such increase relate back to the date of the
note was really a penalty and therefore void; the court saw no
substantial ground for distinguishing Finger from Thompson.5"
The court apparently ignored the basic difference in the computation of the resulting interest charges under Thompson and Finger,
the date upon which the higher interest rate began.
Following the Finger reasoning, a note which contains a
basic interest rate favorable to the borrower, along with an "alternative interest provision" similar to the one accepted by the borrower in Finger, could become an extremely unfavorable contract
for the borrower after maturity. The determining factors for
computing the extra interest charge 'became the alternative interest rate and the total time that credit had been extended.5 9 Although the Finger court deemed the special interest provision an
alternative performance, the provision produced the same result
as a liquidated damages clause. The borrower, however, was
denied the relief he might have gained under sections 1670 and
1671 of the Civil Code. 60 Instead, he was required to "perform"
in the alternative by paying interest charges based on an augmented interest rate.
At the time Thompson and Finger were decided, however,
this result may not have been as onerous as it seems by current
standards. It is likely that the contracts in those cases were the
products of mutual bargaining in which neither the lender nor
the borrower held the upper hand (that is, bargaining "at arm's
length"). In any event, neither Thompson nor Finger appeared
to involve a situation in which the lender dictated interest terms
to the borrower. The same may not be said for modern consumer lending practices, which are best characterized by standard
form contracts, in which borrowers have a significantly limited
opportunity to bargain for terms."
Yet despite this fundamental difference in the bargaining
process, subsequent courts adopted the Thompson and Finger
holdings.
lxxxvi, § 4), which provided that delinquency charges authorized by the contract
and accruing during the term of the contract could, if the contract so provided,
become part of the principal and thereafter bear the same rate of interest as the
principal.
58. 114 Cal. at 66, 45 P. at 1004.
59. Thus, it would seem that a lengthy period before maturity of the note
would result in a large late-interest charge.
60. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
61. Sweet, supra note 4, at 85.
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O'Connorv. Richmond Savings and Loan Association:
alternative performance doctrine and installment payments
During the seventy-two years between the Finger and

O'Connor decisions the California courts said little about the sta8
tus of late-payment provisions in loan contracts." In 1934, however, a new amendment regulating interest rates was added to the

California Constitution. 64 This measure placed a ten percent per

annum maximum on the rate of interest for a loan, but the meas-

ure specifically excepted savings and loan associations from the
scope of its coverage.65
In O'Connor, a group of successor trustors on trust deeds

given by a home builder to a savings and loan association complained to the court about the harsh effects of the late-payment

provision in the loan agreement, which provided that:

"in the event any installment shall not be paid when due,"
the obligor thereunder shall pay "an additional interest
charge upon the balance of said principal sum then unpaid
at the rate of one-half of 1 percent per month from the date
66
such installment was due until the same shall be paid."

As a result of the builder's failure to meet his loan commitments
to the lender before conveyance to his successors in interest, each
of the new owners found himself faced with substantial late

charges owing to the lender.6 7 The appellate court held that the
liquidated damages provisions of the Civil Code were inapplicable
since Thompson and Finger were the controlling precedents in
the case. 68 Although the victims of the late charges argued that
Thompson and Finger were wrongly decided by the California Supreme Court, they were forced to admit that neither case had

ever been disapproved or overruled. 9
A crucial result of the O'Connor decision, judicial extension

62. 262 Cal. App. 2d 523, 68 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1968).
63. Yndart v. Den, 116 Cal. 533, 48 P. 618 (1897), simply reiterated the
arguments of Thompson and Finger.
64. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22, which provides in part:
The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or things in action, or on accounts after demand or judgment rendered in any court of the State, shall be 7 percent per annum but it
shall be competent for the parties to any loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action to contract in writing for a rate of
interest not exceeding 10 percent per annum. . . . However, none of
the above restrictions shall apply to any building and loan association
as defined in and which is operated under that certain act known as
the "Building and Loan Association Act"....
65. See, e.g., Lazzareschi Inv. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 308, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1971).
66. 262 Cal. App. 2d at 529, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 525, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
68. id. at 530, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
69. Id. at 531, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
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of ithe doctrine of alternative performance to an installment payment situation, was announced without comment by the court
Neither Thompson nor Finger had involved provisions for installment payments on loans. Likewise, the O'Connor court failed
to note that while only one borrower was held liable in Thompson and in Finger, seventeen borrowers ultimately bore the brunt
of the late charges assessed by Richmond Savings and Loan Association. 70 The court ignored the passage of time since Thompson and Finger had been decided, and reasoned that the adoption of the usury laws in 1934 had not marred the applicability
of the Thompson and Finger holdings; the court felt bound to
follow these decisions. 7 '
72
Walsh v. Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association:
the final step

In Walsh, decided one year after O'Connor, the borrower
had obtained several loans from a savings and loan association secured by one deed of trust. Each promissory note contained the following provision:
Undersigned agrees, in the event any installment shall
not be paid when due, to pay the holder at its option and
without notice, an additional interest charge upon the balance of said principal sum then unpaid at the rate of onehalf of one percent per month from the date such installment
was due until the same shall be paid.78
The borrower repeatedly fell behind in making payments and suffered frequent assessments on the amount owed. Finally, after
the borrower obtained refinancing from another source, he
brought an action against the lender which included a challenge
74
of the late-charge provisions.
In response to the borrower's assertion that the late-charge
provisions were contractual penalties for nonperformance and
therefore void, the court held that "[i]t is the rule in this state
that late-charge interest is not in the nature of a penalty, and is
valid."' 75 Drawing on O'Connor, which the Walsh court considered to contain a complete discussion of the applicable law on this
subject, the court refused to uphold the borrower's contention
that the late-charge provision must be evaluated according to the
70. The O'Connor decision involved seventeen trust deeds which contained
identical late-charge provisions. Id. at 524-25, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
71. Id. at 530 n.1, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 887 n.1.
72. 1 Cal. App. 3d 578, 81 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1969).
73. Id. at 581, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
74. Id. at 581-82, 81 Cal. Rptr. 806-07.
75. Id. at 585, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 809,
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strictures of the liquidated damages sections of the Civil Code.7"
The Walsh court, like the O'Connor court, relied on the doctrine
to distinguish late charges from liquiof alternative performance
77
dated damages.
It is difficult to ascertain what policy was being advanced by
the O'Connor and Walsh courts. Despite their averments of
stare decisis, they could not realistically overlook drastic changes
in the contractual bargaining process during the seventy years separating the Finger and O'Connor decisions, the disparate bargaining position of the parties, and the substantially new effect of extending the alternative performance rationale to individual installment payments controlled by late-payment provisions. Both
Thompson and Finger involved loan contracts between individuals, while O'Connor and Walsh involved individual borrowers
and institutional lenders. Presumably, in Thompson and Finger
there was a possibility that the parties reached the terms of
their agreements through mutual bargaining. 78 In O'Connor and
Walsh the borrowers probably had no input into the terms of
their contracts beyond the determination of the basic interest
rate and the payment date. 79 Finally, the lenders in Thompson
and Finger did not assess late-interest charges until the entire
debt had matured. The decisions in O'Connor and Walsh permitted the lender to assess a late-interest charge each time the
borrower -missed a payment. The O'Connor and Walsh late-interest provisions did not stop at this point, however. The lenders
in the latter two cases were allowed to reach principal that had
not yet matured with late-interest charges.8 0
The California courts thus left borrowers at the mercy of
large lending institutions that were exempt even from usury laws.
Judicial "sympathy" for the "plight" of these lenders in seeking
to "persuade" borrowers to pay promptly does not explain why
the courts placed a cudgel in their hands to enforce payment. It
may be argued that the only reasonable, though unannounced,
policy behind the O'Connor and Walsh decisions was recogni76. Id.
77. Id. at 586-87, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10.
78. There are no specific factual indications in Thompson or Finger as to
the manner in which the terms of the respective notes were determined by the
parties. Considering, however, the nature of the promissory notes (i.e., shortterm loans which produced relatively insignificant late charges), it is more likely
that both parties in the respective transactions contributed to the terms of the
agreements, than that the lending parties dictated terms to the borrowers.

79. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. It may be questioned whether
the borrowers even had the opportunity to participate in determination of the interest rate on the loan, in that interest rates do not usually differ significantly
among'savings and loan associations.
80. See text accompanying notes 66-77 supra.
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tion of the widespread use of similar late-charge provisions in the
savings and loan industry and determination not to "rock the boat"
until the legislature acted.
Yet in 1973, when the California Supreme Court heard arguments by the parties in Garrett v. Coast and Southern FederalSavings and Loan Association,8 ' the legislature had not acted on late

fees despite tacit admissions by lenders in official legislative reports that a primary purpose of these charges was "motivation"
of the borrower to make prompt payment of the installment, re82

ducing the need for institution of foreclosure proceedings.
For the present the legislature had abdicated initiative to the
courts, which took up the challenge.
THE DEPARTURE FROM THE DOCTRINE OF ALTERNATIVE
PERFORMANCE

Garrettv. Coastand Southern FederalSavings and
Lan Association'

Roberta L. Garrett was one of numerous borrowers whose
loan contracts contained a two percent per annum late interest
charge provision. 4 Garrett brought suit on behalf of herself and
a class of similarly situated obligors 85 who fell within the applicable period of limitations,86 seeking to recover sums paid in satisfaction of the late charges. The plaintiffs contended that the assessments were improper since the late-charge provisions could not
81. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
82. See notes 111-12 and accompanying text infra.
83. 9 Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973).
84. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
85. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (West Supp. 1974) provides in part that
when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for
the benefit of all.
It is noteworthy that this was the first challenge by class action of the status
of late-charge provisions based on interest on the entire principal. It seems important in that it may serve as a further indication of how wide-spread the practice of including similar provisions in contracts had become in the loan industry.
See also 9 Cal. 3d at 740 n.8, 511 P.2d at 1203 n.8, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 851 n.8,
in which the Garrett court includes the results of a study conducted by the State
Savings and Loan Commissioner in 1966. The report establishes that a large
number of state-licensed savings and loan associations charged late fees calculated on the entire principal of the loan.
86. Presumably, the class action in Garrett would fall under CAL. CrV. PRo.
CODE § 337 (West 1970), which provides in part:
Within four years . . .

3.

An action based upon the rescission

of a contract in writing. The time begins to run from the date upon
which the facts that entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred.
Where the ground for rescission is fraud or mistake, the time does not
begin to run until discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. ...
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87
qualify as valid liquidated damages under the Civil Code.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant association caused all of its
contractual installments to be due and payable on the same day of
each month, and automatically sent late notices to all obligors who
failed to submit full payment within nine days of that due date.
Those who failed to meet this deadline were assessed late charges
by the association. In calculating the charges for delinquent
payments, the lender made no attempt to distinguish between
those who paid their installments a few days late, a few weeks late,
or not at all for the month in question.8 8 The association demurred to the plaintiffs' contention that the late charges were
assessments which could not qualify as liquidated damages and
were therefore void.8" The trial court entered a dismissal after
sustaining, without leave to amend, the defendant's demurrer on0
the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The dismissal order was affirmed by the court of appeal.
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Wright,
the California Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and
remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to overrule
the association's demurrer. 91 Although limited on this appeal to a
determination of the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of
law, the supreme court chose to thoroughly examine the legality
of late-charge interest provisions in loan agreements. The court
specifically evaluated the doctrine of alternative performance in
this context, analyzed the meaning and ramifications of Thompson, Finger, O'Connor, and Walsh, and, finally, tested late-charge
interest provisions against the statutory provisions for liquidated
damages. 92 In short, the Garrett court was seeking93 the true function and character of late-charge interest provisions.
The supreme court rejected interpretation of the late-charge
interest provisions as alternative performance under the contracts.
The court reasoned that the consideration given by the borrower
for the contractual "option" to pay late was, in reality, a penalty
for nonperformance.9 4 The Garrett court determined that accept87. 9 Cal. 3d at 734, 511 P.2d at 1199, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 847. See also
text accompanying notes 15-30 supra.
88. 9 Cal. 3d at 734, 511 P.2d at 1199, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
89. Id. The defendant had also demurred to the plaintiffs' complaint on the
ground that the cause was not the proper subject of a class action, but the lower
court had overruled the demurrer as to that ground and the defendant had not
appealed the ruling., Id. at 735 n.2, 511 P.2d at 1199 n.2, 108 Cal. Rptr. at
847 n.2.
90. Id. at 734, 511 P.2d at 1199, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
91. Id. at 742, 511 P.2d at 1204, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
92. CAL. Civ. CoDn §§ 1670-71 (West 1970).
93. 9 Cal. 3d at 735, 511 P.2d at 1199, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
94. Id. at 737, 511 P.2d at 1200-01, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
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ance of the late-charge provision as an alternative performance
amounted to condonation of a result directly prohibited by the
legislature." Permitting forfeiture of an apparent penalty in
exchange for the "right" to exercise an "option" to default on
making timely installment payments, the court reasoned, is inconsistent with the legislative intent to control liquidated damages.
Clearly it was the duty of the court to ignore form and seek out
substance in arrangements which purport to legitimate penalties
and forfeitures.90
The Garrett court adopted a harsh attitude toward the progeny of Thompson. The court specifically overruled Finger's
retroaotive application of late-charge interest to the full principal
of a loan by means of an alternative performance theory. It reasoned that since the increased interest rate was made retroactive,
the borrower became obligated for a sum in addition to what he
had contracted to pay under the terms of the promissory note as
a direct consequence of default. Accordingly, the validity of the
interest provision should have been controlled by applicable statutory provisions relating to liquidated damages.1 7 Without discussing the factual situations in O'Connor and Walsh, the court
added that it disapproved of these decisions for the same reait had disapproved of Finger.9 8 The Garrett court then outlined
its approach to the doctrine of alternative performance by stating
that
when it is manifest that a contract expressed ,to be performed
in the alternative is in fact a contract contemplating but a
single, definite performance with an additional charge contingent on the breach of that performance, the provision cannot escape examination in light of pertinent rules relative to
the liquidation of damages. 99
It was apparent to the Garrett court that the defendant's latecharge provision failed to meet the statutory requirements for
liquidated damages. The court found that the lender had imposed
by contract an additional sum to be paid by the borrower in
the event of default. Although this sum was indicated by the
95. Id. at 737, 511 P.2d at 1201-02, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
96. Id. at 737, 511 P.2d at 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 849. See Caplan v.
Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 64 P.2d 371, 15 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1961); Freedman
v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
97. 9 Cal. 3d at 737, 511 P.2d at 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
98. Id. at 737-38, 511 P.2d at 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
99. Id. at 738, 511 P.2d at 1201, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 849. See also Paolilli
v. Pisctelli, 45 R.I. 354, 121 A. 531 (1923); WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs § 781 (3d
ed. 1957). The Garrett court indicated that "[plerformance cannot be said to
be in the alternative where breach of a former covenant is necessary to give effect to a later covenant." 9 Cal. 3d at 738 n.6, 511 P.2d at 1201 n.6, 108 Cal.
Rptr. at 849 n.6.
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contract to be an interest charge, 'the court construed it as a penalty in the absence of a showing that the sum bore any relationship to a loss suffered by the lender as a result of the borrower's
The court noted that there is a fundamental differdefault. 10
ence between interest and penalty charges; interest is a measure
of compensation to which an obligee is entitled, while a penalty is
punitive in nature. Likewise, a charge for late payment of a loan
installment that is measured against the unpaid balance of the
loan was held by the court to be punitive in that it is nothing more
is
than an attempt to coerce timely payment by a forfeiture that
0'
not reasonably calculated to compensate the injured lender."
If the sum extracted from the borrower is designed to exceed
substantially the damages suffered by the lender, the provision for the additional sum, whatever its label, is an invalid
attempt to impose a penalty inasmuch as its primary purpose
is to compel prompt payment through the threat of imposito the amount
tion of charges bearing little or no relationship
10 2
of the actual loss incurred by the lender.
The Garrett court did not advocate allowing defaulting borrowers to escape unscathed. It noted that in the present action
Coast was still entitled to actual damages it had suffered as a result of the defaults. Actual damages could include an amount
based on the size of the payments and the period they had been
wrongfully withheld. Additionally, the lender was to be allowed
to charge the 'borrower for administrative costs reasonably 3related to the collection and accounting for the late payment.'
Although the Garrett court did not deny the possibility of
providing liquidated damages provisions in loan contracts that
could withstand the scrutiny of sections 1670-1671 of the Civil
Code, it offered little encouragement for this approach. The
court noted that damages for the wrongful withholding of money
100. 9 Cal. 3d at 739, 511 P.2d at 1202, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 850. The Garrett
court supported this finding with a statement from the defendant's loan booklet,
which was issued to each borrower:
Payments should be mailed early enough to -reach us by the due date.
The cost of handling delinquent payments, even when we know in advance -that they will be late, amounts to more expense than most people
imagine. Hence we spread the entire average expense among the customers who are late; these charges are quite high .....
Id. at 739 n.7, 511 P.2d at 1202 n.7, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 850 n.7.
101. Id. at 739-40, 511 P.2d at 1202-03, 108 Cal. Rptr. 850-51.
102. Id. at 740, 511 P.2d at 1203, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 851.. See also First Am.
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592, 596-97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645,
647 (1970); Lagorio v. Yerxa, 96 Cal. App. 111, 214 P.2d 828 (1929); cf. Clermont v. Secured Inv, Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 766, 769,102 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342
(1972)..103. 9 Cal. 3d at 741,511 P.2d at 1203, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 851. See Farthing v. San Mateo Clinic, 143 Cal. App. 2d 385, 299 P.2d 977 (1956).
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are fixed by law in California"" and that other damages that
the lender might suffer as a result of the borrower's default,
such as administrative and accounting costs, do not appear to
present extreme difficulty in determining prospectively. 0 5
It may be posited that the Garrett decision reflects "the age
of consumerism." Through a logical series of steps the supreme court pierced the facade of alternative performance and
exposed the late interest charge for what it was, an invalid penalty for nonperformance. The Garrett court, unlike the O'Connor and Walsh courts, was willing to acknowledge inferentially
that "arm's length bargaining" is a myth for the consumer. The
reality for the consumer is the form contract. He assents through
reading and signing, rather than through bargaining for the terms
of the contract. Thus, to accord special sanctity to this type of
contractual
language ignores the actual relationship between the
06
parties.1
The practical effect of the Garrett decision on late-payment
charges based on similar contractual provisions that have already
been assessed by other lenders, and that fall within the applicable
statute of limitations will, barring legislative intervention, 1 7 have
to be decided by the courts. If, as it has been suggested
above, the use of such delinquency provisions is widespread, millions of dollars are at stake.' 08
THE FUTURE OF LIQUIDATION CLAUSES IN LOAN CONTRACTS AFTER
GARRETT

As a consequence of the Garrett decision, late-charge provisions in loan contracts must now meet the criteria for valid liquidated damages or fail as contractual penalties for nonperformance. This requirement may prove to be a hollow victory for
consumers. Were the lender able to devise a late-payment provision that could survive as a liquidation clause, a task which the.
Garrett court indicated would probably fail, this provision could
not contain a "motivation factor," a sum reasonably designed to
104. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3302 (West 1970) provides:
The detriment caused by the breach of an obligation to pay money
only, is deemed to be the amount due by the terms of the obligation,
with interest thereon.
105.

9 Cal. 3d at 741 n.11, 511 P.2d at 1204 n.11, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 852

n.11.
106. Sweet, supra note 4, at 85.

107. For a recent example of legislative nullification of a California Supreme
Court decision that portended millions of dollars in potential liability for the savings and loan industry, see Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d
850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968), which was abrogated by CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3434 (West 1970), passed the following year.

108. See note 86 supra.
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"encourage" prompt payment of the installment, without amounting to an exorbitant or unconscionable charge. 10 9 Instead the
lender would be entitled to no more than interest on the amount
of the payment for the period it was wrongfully withheld, and administrative and accounting costs incurred by the lender as a result of the withholding of the payment, in addition to the principal amount of the payment."10 Since the sum of these extra
charges would be considerably less than a charge based on an interest assessment against the principal of the loan, the "motivation factor" of the late charge would be substantially reduced, if
not eliminated. When this "motivation factor" is absent, lenders
argue, borrowers are tempted to use their funds to meet obligations other than the installment payment."' Most lenders will
allow no more than sixty days to elapse from the due date of
payment before filing notice of a delinquency and instituting foreclosure proceedings. Once foreclosure proceedings are under
way, the cost to the borrower for 12curing the default is significantly
higher than a reasonable late fee.1
The effectiveness of such a "motivation factor" may, however, be disputed. At the time a borrower executes a promissory note, he will usually pay little attention to late-payment provisions or other penalty provisions. The main interests of a borrower in a real property loan transaction are the interest rate, the
term of the loan, and the monthly payments. Most borrowers
have no intention of making late payments when they obtain the
loan and are not apt to quibble over delinquency payment
clauses."' Since significant bargaining between the parties is
,unlikely in any event,"14 the borrower must accept whatever latepayment charges the lender chooses and the law permits.
The above analysis suggests that legislative reform may be
the only satisfactory method to strike a balance between the need
for the lender to protect his investment and the plight of the
borrower seeking to escape foreclosure when he makes late installment payments.
A current proposal before the California Legislature provides
109. See text accompanying notes 5 and 21 supra.
110. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra. Since savings and loan
associations are not presently subject to usury laws (see notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra), it is not clear how much interest they may charge for
money withheld wrongfully by borrowers.
111. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY FINANCE AND INSURANCE COMMrTEE, FINAL REPORT ON LATE PAYMENT FnS 11-12 (May 20, 1970).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 12-13.
114. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
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one potential approach to striking this balance.115 This proposal
was developed in late 1973 by the influential California Law Revision Commission and seeks a general overhaul of the California Civil Code provisions regulating liquidated damages in contracts. 116 The proposal would replace the current code sections
with a new series of provisions which would necessitate an altered judicial approach to liquidated damages in general and to
late-payment charges in loan contracts in particular.
The Law Revision Commission Proposal-LiquidatedDamages

With regard to liquidated damages, the legislative proposal
stipulates that contractual provisions for liquidated damages, unless otherwise regulated by statute, will be valid unless found to be
unreasonable. 117 The Law Revision Commission believes that
this language would reverse the basic disapproval of liquidated
damages provisions reflected in the present statutory language"'
and case law," 9 while still allowing the courts to set aside such
provisions in situations where the provisions are oppressive. 120
The Commission further recommends that when the courts do
intervene to evaluate liquidated damages provisions, they should
judge the "reasonableness" of a provision in view of the circum,
stances confronting the parties at the time the contract was
made.' 2 ' The courts should not include the perspective of hindsight in making their determination as to the amount of damages, since that defeats one of the primary purposes for including
a liquidation provision in a contract: avoiding litigation in determining the amount of actual damages. 122
The comment to the proposed liquidated damages statute
limits the circumstances which may be taken into consideration
115. Cal. S.B. 1532, Reg. Sess., introduced by State Senator Stevens.on January 10, 1974.

116. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1670-71 (West 1970).
117. The new provision for liquidated damages provided for in Cal. S.B.
1532 would become CAL. CIV. CODE § 3319, and provide:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a provision in a contract liquidating the damages for breach of a contractual obligation is
valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes that
it was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract.
(b) Subdivision (a) does not apply to provisions included in public
contracts pursuant to Section 14376 or 53069.85 of the Government
Code.

118. 11 CAL. LAw REVIsION COMM'N, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDLns 1201, 1209 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CLRC].
119. Id. See also text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.

120. CLRC, supra note 118, at 1209.
121. Id. See also text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
122. CLRC, supra note 118, at 1209; see text accompanying note 25 supra.
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in determining the "reasonableness" of a particular provision.
The relative equality of bargaining power of the parties could be
appraised. Likewise, evidence of anticipation by the parties that
proof of actual damages would be costly or inconvenient to determine may be considered. The amount of damages stipulated by
parties may be compared to the range of damages that could
have been reasonably forecast by the parties when the contract
was made. Finally, whether or not the liquidation clause results
from a "form contract" provided by one of the parties may be
taken into consideration in determining the "reasonableness" of
the clause. If a "form contract" is involved, the court should
then carefully scrutinize the circumstances at the time the contract was made to insure against "unreasonable benefits" accru*mg to the party who submitted the contract. The comment
further stipulates that nothing in the new statute would affect the
12
power of the court to modify or nullify a contract of adhesion.
The list of circumstances relevant to the determination of
"reasonableness" of liquidated damages provisions reflects a tightening of the "look forward" approach in evaluating such provisions. In addition to replacing statutory antipathy with sympathy for liquidation provisions, the list implements a policy favoring such provisions. 1 24 With the exception of form contracts,
the court may not look beyond the time at which the contract was
made in reaching a conclusion regarding the "reasonableness"
of a -liquidation clause. As further evidence of a more expansive approach to liquidation provisions, the comment includes
a specific reference to placement of the burden of proof in cases
involving such provisions. The Law Revision Commission advocates placing the burden of pleading and proving that a liquidation provision is invalid on the party seeking to avoid the provision. 12' The comment to the proposed statutory enactment on
liquidated damages concludes that the new section
does not limit the use of liquidated damages provisions to
cases where damages would be difficult to fix or where ithe
amount selected by the parties reflects a reasonable effort
• to estimate the probable amount of actual damages. Instead,
the parties are given considerable leeway to determine damages for breach. All the circumstances existing at the time
of the making of the contract are considered including but
not limited to the relationship the damages provided bear
be anticipated
to the range of harm that reasonably 1could
26
contract.
the
of
making
the
at the time of
123.
124.
125.
126.

CLRC, supra note 118, at 1223.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id. at 1224 (emphasis by the authors).
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It appears likely that the Commission's proposal on liquidated damages would, if enacted, encourage the use of liquidated
damages provisions in contracts. It may be queried, however,
whether this encouragement is beneficial. In an ideal situation
involving informed parties represented by counsel and specific negotiation over liquidation provisions, the proposed statute may,
as the Commission asserts, serve the interests of both parties.1"7
But how frequently does this situation occur? As was suggested
above, evidence pertaining to the manner in which contracting
parties determine liquidation amounts usually is not readily available.12 8 It does not seem to this writer that saddling the breaching party with a strong statutory presumption in favor of the liquidation provision provides a satisfactory solution.
This criticism is not intended to imply that the Commission's proposal on liquidated damages is without merit. This
writer agrees with the Commission's position "that the use of liquidated damages provisions is beneficial and should be encouraged, subject to limitations to protect against the oppressive use of
such provisions."' 29 "Encouragement," however, is not the same
as "burden of proof". Relaxing the burden of proof on the party
seeking to benefit from the liquidated damages provision would
probably have the effect of encouraging the use of such provisions without "digging a presumptive grave"- for the defaulting
party. This writer feels that a total shift of the burden of proof
to the defaulting party would be unnecessarily harmful to his interests.
The Law Revision Commission Proposal-Late-PaymentCharges
on Loans Secured by Real Property
In contrast to the proposal's suggested relaxation of legislative controls over liquidated damages, narrow limitations on the
use of liquidated damages in the form of late-payment charges on
installment loans secured by real property are advocated in the
proposed legislation.180 Although the recommended statute
127. CLRC, supra note 118, at 1208-09. See also text accompanying notes
11-14 supra.
128. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
129. CLRC, supra note 118, at 1209; see text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
130. The new provision for late payment charges indicated in Cal. S.B. 1532
would be CAL. Civ.

CODE

§ 2954.6, which provides:

(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Late payment charge" means a charge, whether or not characterized in the loan contract as interest, that is imposed for late payment
of an installment payment due on a loan secured by a mortgage or deed
of trust on real property.
(2) "Installment payment" means that portion of a periodic pay-
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would allow such late-payment charges, it prohibits their levy
against the borrower unless he fails to pay the full amount of

that installment within ten days of the scheduled due date of the
installment. Payments received by the lender must be applied
first to the current installment that is due; any surplus may be apment that comprises any one or more of the following: principal, interest, and funds to be allocated to impound accounts for property taxes,
special assessments, and insurance.
(b) Except as provided in subdivision (c), a provision in the loan
contract imposing a late payment charge is valid if it satisfies the requirements of Sections 2954.5 and 3319 [for the text of § 2954.5, see
note 108 infra].
(c) Where each of a majority of the installment payments is less
than five hundred dollars ($500), a provision in the loan contract imposing a late payment charge is valid if it satisfies the requirements
of Section 2954.5 and both of the following conditions:
(1) No late payment charge may be collected on an installment
payment which is tendered or paid in full within 10 days after its
scheduled due date even though an earlier maturing installment payment, or a late payment charge on an earlier installment payment, may
not have been paid in full. For the purposes of this subdivision, an
installment payment shall be considered paid as of the date it is received by the lender and, unless the borrower otherwise directs at the
time the installment is paid, payments shall be applied first to current
installment payments and then to delinquent installment payments.
(2) The amount of the late payment charge shall not exceed 10
percent of the amount of principal and interest included in the installment payment except that, where the amount of principal and interest
included in the installment payment is less than fifty dollars ($50), a
charge not to exceed five dollars ($5) or 20 percent of the amount of
principal and interest included in the installment payment, whichever
is the lesser amount, may be made.
(d) If the late payment charge referred to in subdivision (c) is
not paid within 40 days from the scheduled due date of the delinquent
installment payment for which the charge was imposed, the lender may,
at his option, add the late payment charge to the principal and thereafter charge interest on it at the contract rate. If the lender elects to
add the late payment charge to principal, he cannot thereafter treat the
failure to pay the late payment charge as a default.
(e) This section limits only the obligation of a borrower to pay
the
a late payment charge. Nothing in this section excuses or defersloan
borrower's performance of any other obligation incurred in the
transaction, nor does this section impair or defer the right of the lender
to enforce any other obligation, including but not limited to, the right
to recover costs and expenses incurred in any enforcement proceeding
authorized by law.
(f) This section does not apply to loans made by a credit union
subject to the provisions of Division 5 (commencing with Section
14000) of the Financial Code, by an industrial loan company subject
to the provisions of Division 7 (commencing with Section 18000) of
the Financial Code, or by a personal property broker subject to the provision of Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) of the Financial
Code.
-Cal. A.B. 105, Reg. Sess. (1973), introduced by Assemblyman Deddeh at the
1973 session, proposes that a maximum charge of ten percent be imposed on late
installment payments due on a loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on
real property containing only a single-family, owner-occupied dwelling. It would
also prohibit late charges from being imposed more than once for the same late
payment of an installment and from being imposed on any installment which is
paid or tendered in full when due even though an earlier maturing installment
or late charge on an earlier installment may not have been paid in full when
due. Cal. A.B. 105, Reg. Sess. (1973).
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plied to earlier, past-due installments and to late changes already incurred. Thus, despite failure by the borrower to meet
previous payment deadlines, he will not be assessed for late
charges on a current installment if he makes a timely payment
of the full amount of that installment.'1'
The proposed statute sets a maximum limit on the amount
assessed against a lender for each delinquency of ten percent of
principal and interest due on the particular installment. If, however, the amount of principal and interest owed for the installment is less than fifty dollars, the lender may impose a late charge
of five dollars or twenty percent of the principal and interest,
whichever is the lesser of the two. 13 2 The statute would give the
lender an option to add a late-payment charge to the principal of
the loan and charge interest on the sum at the contract rate if the
borrower fails to pay the charge within forty days from the sched,uled due date of the delinquent installments for which the late
183
charge was assessed.
In its comment to the late-charge proposal, the Law Revision Commission indicates its desire to set forth clear and definite
rules to overcome "uncertainty" regarding the use of late charges
in loan contracts as a result of the Garrett decision. The comment indicates that the new statutory requirements for late
charges on loans may not be avoided by labeling the payment of
such charges as interest under the contract. 8 4 The comment
also indicates that assessment of a late charge will'have to meet
the statutory prerequisites for imposition of a delinquent payment charge. 38 Finally, the comment stipulates that a properly131.

CRLC, supra note 118, at 1215.

132. Id. at 1216.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1220.

135. Id. at 1221; CAL. CIv. CODE § 2954.5 (West Supp. 1974), which provides
in part:
(a) Before the first default, delinquency, or late payment- charge
may be assessed by any lender on a delinquent payment of a loan, other
than a loan made pursuant to Section 22466 of the Financial Code, secured by real property, and before the borrower becomes obligated to
pay such a charge, the borrower shall either (1) be notified in writing
and given at least six days from mailing of such notice in which to
cure the delinquency, or (2) be informed, by a billing or notice sent
for each payment due on the loan, of the date after which such a
charge will be assessed.
The notice provided in either paragraph (1) or (2) shall contain
the amount of such charge or the method by which it is calculated.
(b) If a subsequent payment becomes delinquent the borrower'
shall be notified in writing, before the late charge is to be imposed,
that the charge will be imposed if payment is not received, or the borrower shall be notified at least semiannually of the total amount of late
charges imposed during the period covered by the notice..
(e) The failure of the lender to comply with the requirements of
this section does not excuse or defer the borrower's performance of any
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assessed late charge shall be considered valid unless the borrower
can prove that it was unreasonable at the time the contract was
made.'
How does the new legislative proposal compare to the requirements for a valid late charge suggested by the Garrett court?
Both reject the doctrine of alternative performance as a means
fdr characterizing late interest charges to avoid statutory controls on liquidated damages.' 8 7 The Garrett opinion indicated
that the actual damages borne by the lender may be determined by
the amount of the installment payment, the period during which
payment was wrongfully withheld, and the reasonable cost
the
'of' administrative
procedures resulting from the delinquency.' 38
The legislative proposal would impose a maximum charge of
ten percent of the principal and interest due on the installment in
question in the event that the borrower fails to pay within ten days
of the scheduled date of payment.18 9 Additionally, the proposal
would permit late charges which have not been paid within forty
days of the date on which they accrued to be added to the principal of the loan and to produce interest at the contract rate. ' It
may be argued that this type of calculation provides convenience to the lender rather than protection to the borrower. The
borrower achieves no more benefit by paying eleven days after the
installment was due than 'by paying thirty-nine days after the
'due date, since the late charge is imposed automatically on the
eleventh day following the due date. The plaintiffs in Garrett
complained bitterly about this summary method of assessment. 4 °
The Law Revision Commission's proposed late-charge provision bears some resemblance to the delinquency charges provision' 4 ' of the Unruh Act. 14 2 Both establish a ten-day grace period,
obligation incurred in the loan transaction, other than his obligation to
pay a late payment charge, nor does it impair or defer the right of the
lender to enforce any other obligation including the costs and expenses

incurred in any enforcement authorized by law.
136. CLRC, supra note 118, at 1221.
137. See text accompanying notes 94-96 and 99 supra.
138. See text accompanying note 103 supra.

139. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 88 supra.

141. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1803.6 (West 1970), which provides:
A contract may provide for the payment by the buyer of a delinquency charge on each installment in default for a period of not less

than 10 days in an amount not in excess of 5 percent of such installment or five dollars ($5), whichever is less, but a minimum charge of
one dollar ($1) may be made. Only one such delinquency charge may
be collected on any such installment regardless of the period during

which it remains in default. The contract may also provide for payment of any actual and reasonable costs of collection occasioned by re-

moval of the goods from the State without written permission of the
holder, or by the failure of the buyer to notify the holder of any change
of residence, or by failure of the buyer to communicate with the holder
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both provide for calculation of the assessment as a percentage
amount of the currently-owed installment payment, and both provide a further remedy for the lender when the borrower fails to
take specified action for an extended period. The Commission's
proposal may, however, have a significantly harsher economic
effect on borrowers. The proposal would allow a maximum percentage figure for the purpose of calculating the late-charge assessment which is twice the maximum allowed under the Unruh
Act. 4 ' The Unruh Act permits only one assessment of delinquency charges for an individual default, while the Commission's
proposal would permit the lender to add amounts in default beyond forty days to the principal of the loan and to charge interest
on such amounts at the contract rate after the lender has (presumably) 44already assessed a late-payment charge against the bor1
rower.
One possible explanation for the discrepancies between the
Commission's proposal and the Unruh Act is that the Commission may be attempting to include the elusive "motivation factor' 145 urged by lenders' 46 in the late-charge calculation and assessment procedure. It may be recalled, however, that the lender
in Garrett had collected nearly two million dollars in late-payment charges during the four years immediately preceding the
plaintiffs' suit.' 47 If motivation of timely payments was the purpose for assessing high late charges, it appears not to have had
the desired effect; each of the affected borrowers in Garrett paid
an average of nearly four hundred dollars in late charges during
that period, which suggests repeated late payments rather than
increased efforts to pay on time. The experiences of the borrowers in Garrett have convinced this writer that the "motivation"
value of late-payment provisions in loan contracts is nominal and
does not provide any rationale for increasing the amount of a
late-charge assessment.
for a period of 45 days after any default in making payments due under the contract.
142.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1801 et seq. (West 1970).

143. Although the basic maximum percentage rate provided in the Commission's proposal is ten percent, the proposal would allow a higher figure, twenty
percent or five dollars, whichever is less, to be used in calculating late-charge
assessments when the installment is less than fifty dollars. CLRC, supra note
118, at 1219.
144. The delinquency charges provision of the Unruh Act (see note 141 supra) permits the seller to irclude a stipulated charge in the installment sales contract for actual collection costs related to obtaining payments which are more
than forty-five days late. This stipulation, however, seems more analogous to
foreclosure costs than to the Commission provision for adding specified latecharge assessments to the loan principal.
145. See text accompanying notes 109-14 supra.
146. See notes 111-12 and accompanying text supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.

THE HIGH COST OF BORROWING

1974]

CONCLUSION

The situation faced by the Garrett court in 1973 indicates
that slavish adherence to stare decisis may sometimes produce unfortunate results. The O'Connor and Walsh courts may be fairly
criticized for failing to consider differences between the factual
situations in Thompson and Fingerand their own.
The Garrett court was able to comprehend these differences and to dismiss the theory of alternative performance in the
loan installment context as a sham which served no purpose other
than to circumvent legislative prohibition of contractual penalties.
Apparently, the Garrett decision has reached receptive ears.
Despite the California Law Revision Commission's tendency
to favor lenders rather than borrowers in its late-charge proposal,
the proposal arguably falls within the Garrett guidelines for assessment of late fees: it is a reasonable sum based on the amount
of the individual installment. For this reason, passage of the
Commission's late-charge proposal in its present form would appear
acceptable to the Garrettcourt and a step forward for small borrowers. 14

8

Michael R. Burk

148. In May, 1974, the California State Senate dropped Senate Bill 1532 after
the California Law Revision Commission withdrew its support for the measure.
The Commission decided to give the subject of liquidated damages and late-payment fees further study after numerous influential groups, including the Board of
Governors of the State Bar and the Western Center on Law and Poverty, expressed opposition to the proposed changes. Copies of several of the letters received by the Commission are on file in the office of the Santa Clara Lawyer.

